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Are Threats Always "Violent" Crimes? 
Jeremy D. Feinstein 
INTRODUCTION 
You are enjoying a quiet evening at home in Michigan when you 
receive a phone call. An unfamiliar voice says, "I know where you 
live, and I'm coming to kill you." Upset by this incident, you report 
it to the police. A short time later the police tell you that they have 
traced the call and identified the perpetrator: a patient confined to 
a mental hospital in Hawaii, who apparently called your number 
either by mistake or at random. The police inform you that even 
though the threatener is already committed to a psychiatric facility, 
they intend to prosecute him for the crime of making threats.1 
Does this threat constitute a "violent" crime? If not, what if the 
threatener had turned out to be a disgruntled former employee of 
your company, twice convicted of committing violent crimes, who 
lived nearby? In other words, is the answer influenced by the ap-
parent likelihood - or lack thereof - of the threat being carried 
out? If the Hawaii mental patient's threat is a "violent" crime, does 
this mean that a statement of intent to do something "violent" is 
always an act "of violence"? 
It is important to think about the answers to these questions 
because, under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guide-
lines ),2 the characterization of a crime as "violent" or "non-violent" 
is significant for a defendant in two ways. First, if a crime is consid-
1. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994) prohibits any interstate transmission of a threat to kidnap or 
injure the person of another. For a discussion of the elements of threat offenses, see infra 
Part I. 
Chapter 41 of 18 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. § 871 et seq. (1994), contains a number of statutes 
criminalizing various types of threats. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994) (making it a crime to 
convey through the mail a threat to kill, injure, or kidnap the President); 18 U.S.C. § 876 
(1994) (prohibiting the transmission of threats by mail); 18 U.S.C. § 878 (1994) (prohibiting 
threats against foreign officials); 18 U.S.C. § 879 (1994) (prohibiting threats against former 
presidents). Courts considering cases brought under one of these statutes usually feel free to 
apply precedent from any of the other statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d 
1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 1992) (looking to 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1982) for guidance even though the 
instant case was brought under § 879). Consequently, when this Note refers to "punishable 
threats," the particular statute under which the threats would be punished is not important. 
2. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1994). Federal courts 
are required to impose sentences within the range stipulated by the Guidelines for a particu-
lar crime, except when unusual aggravating or mitigating circumstances are present. See 18 
u.s.c. § 3553(b) (1994). 
At the time this issue of the Michigan Law Review went to press - January 1996 - the 
revised Guidelines Manual from November 1994 was the latest available edition. The Sen-
tencing Commission customarily revises the Guidelines every November, but the November 
1995 revisions were not yet available. 
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ered a "non-violent offense" and the defendant committed it while 
suffering from "reduced mental capacity," he may be entitled to a 
sentence reduction under section 5K2.13 (the "reduced mental ca-
pacity provision") of the Guidelines.3 Second, if a crime is consid-
ered a "crime of violence" and the defendant previously has been 
convicted of two other "crimes of violence," he may be considered 
a "career offender" under section 4Bl.1 (the "career offender pro-
vision") and receive a more severe sentence than he otherwise 
would.4 Thus, the violent or non-violent nature of an offense may 
have substantial impact on the length of a defendant's sentence. 
Characterization of an offense as "violent" or "non-violent" can 
be difficult,5 especially with respect to threats,6 which do not seem 
to fall squarely within either the violent or non-violent category of 
3. See USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. As a general matter, the Guidelines prescribe sentences 
based on the nature of the offense committed and the defendant's criminal history, see USSG 
§ lBl.1, and the mental or emotional state of the defendant is not a consideration, see USSG 
§ 5Hl.3, p.s. The reduced mental capacity provision is an exception to this approach. It 
states: 
If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly 
reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a 
lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity 
contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal 
history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public. 
USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. 
Section 5K2.13 does not provide a definition or a cross-reference for the term non-violent 
offense. There is also no definition provided for the term reduced mental capacity, but this 
omission does not seem to have created as much controversy. 
4. USSG § 4Bl.1. Section 4Bl.1 effectuates the congressional desire that "career" of-
fenders be sentenced" 'at or near the maximum term authorized.'" USSG § 4Bl.1, com-
ment. (backg'd.) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (1994). Hence, a defendant is likely to receive a 
very severe sentence if he qualifies as a career offender. 
Career offenders are criminals who have committed either a crime of violence or a con-
trolled substance offense and previously have been convicted of two other such crimes. USSG 
§ 4Bl.1. Both of these terms are defined in USSG § 4Bl.2. The meaning and significance of 
the crime of violence definition are discussed at length infra section III.C. The definition of 
controlled substance offense is not relevant to this Note. 
5. Judges and professors alike have noted the difficulty of assigning meaning to the term 
violence. For instance, in Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981), the majority 
held that voir dire questions regarding racial prejudice are permitted when the crime in-
volved was a "violent crime." Justice Rehnquist responded to this holding by commenting 
that "knowing the contentiousness of our profession, the suggestion that a precise definition 
of 'violent crime' ... will ever be arrived at leaves me unwilling to lay down the flat rule .•• 
proposed [by the majority]." 451 U.S. at 194-95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
A similar perspective can be found in the work of John Harris, who comments: 
Despite its pervasive interest, there is surprisingly little agreement on the question of 
what violence in fact is, and what is in fact violence . ... 
. • . [T]he champions of various definitions are not even able to agree to differ, but 
are all evangelists in the cause of their own conception of violence. This disagreement 
has seemed so intractable and pointless to one philosopher that he has gone so far as to 
recommend that the word "violence" be abandoned altogether, as far too confused a 
notion for consistent use. 
JoHN HAruus, VIOLENCE AND REsPONSmILITY 11-12 (1980) (citing Robert Paul Wolff, On 
Violence, 66 J. PHn.. 602 (1969)). 
6. A threat is "[a] communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm on any person or 
property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1480 (6th ed. 1990). 
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crimes. Reflecting this difficulty, the federal courts of appeals have 
split regarding whether threats ever may be considered "non-
violent offenses" for purposes of deciding whether a defendant 
should be eligible for a sentence reduction under the reduced 
mental capacity provision.7 Some say that whether an offense is 
"non-violent" depends on the particular facts and circumstances of 
the case and that consequently at least some threats may be consid-
ered "non-violent offenses."8 Others look at the definition of 
"crime of violence" in the career offender provision, and, because 
this definition appears to characterize all threats as "crimes of vio-
lence," they conclude that threats should never be considered "non-
violent offenses."9 
This Note argues that because the generally accepted legal 
meaning of violence is the use - or the risk of the use - of physi-
cal force so as to injure, damage, or abuse, threats only should be 
considered violent if they involve a risk of the use of physical force. 
Part I examines the substantive law of threats to determine if they 
inherently involve a risk of the use of physical force, and concludes 
that they do not. Part II studies the meaning of the term violence, 
and argues that both courts and dictionaries understand the term to 
mean the use - or the risk of the use - of physical force so as to 
injure, damage, or abuse. Part ill then draws on the analysis of 
Parts I and II and concludes that courts should consider threats vio-
lent offenses only when they involve the risk of the use of force; 
riskless threats should qualify as "non-violent offenses" under the 
reduced mental capacity provision and should not be considered 
"crimes of violence" for purposes of the career offender provision. 
7. Recall that offenders are not eligible for a sentence reduction under the reduced 
mental capacity provision unless their crime was a ''non-violent offense." 
8. See United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1994) (agreeing with the 
district court's decision to consider the facts and circumstances of the case in order to deter-
mine whether the defendant's offense was "non-violent"); United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 
532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994) (looking at the facts and circumstance of the offense); United States 
v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (considering all the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the offense). The Tenth Circuit also may endorse this view, though its 
analysis is difficult to follow. See United States v. Spedalieri, 910 F2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 
1990) (holding that even though the defendant committed a "violent act," the trial judge 
properly "exercised his discretion not to depart downward" and that the judge "could con-
sider the mental capacity" of the defendant (emphasis added)). 
9. This approach thus involves "cross-applying" the crime of violence definition from the 
career offender provision to the reduced mental capacity provision. The leading case taking 
this approach is United States v. Poff, 926 F2d 588, 592 (7th Cir.) (holding that "crime[s] of 
violence" as defined by § 4Bl.2 - the career offender provision - and "non-violent of-
fense[s ]"as defined by § 5K2.13 - the reduced mental capacity provision - are mutually 
exclusive categories), cert denied, 502 U.S. 827 (1991). Other circuits have used the same or 
similar reasoning. See United States v. Kyles, 40 F.3d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 
S. Ct. 1419 (1995); United States v. Dailey, 24 F.3d 1323, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1994); United 
States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rosen, 896 F.2d 789, 
791 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v. Maddalena, 893 F2d 815, 819 (6th Cir.1989), cert denied, 
502 U.S. 882 (1991). 
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Finally, Part IV considers how courts should determine whether a 
threat created risk and argues that courts should consider a threat 
to have created risk - and therefore to be violent - whenever 
they find two facts: (1) the defendant had a genuine intent to carry 
out the threat, and (2) the defendant had the ability to carry out the 
threat. 
I. THE HARM CAUSED BY THREATS 
To begin to evaluate whether threats should always be consid-
ered violent crimes, it is necessary first to develop an understanding 
of the nature of criminal threats. The conduct involved in a threat 
is simple; all that is required is a communicated intent to kill or 
injure.10 The harm caused by a threat, however, is more compli-
cated and requires some analysis. 
In theory, threats are capable of causing two types of harm: 
they can create fear in the recipient of the threat, and they can cre-
ate a risk that the threatened conduct actually will take place. The 
Supreme Court has described the harms caused by threats as "the 
fear of violence . . . [and] the possibility that the threatened vio-
lence will occur."11 In practice, however, courts eschew considera-
tion of risk creation when determining whether a threat is 
criminal.12 All that is required is that the threat reasonably could 
have induced fear in the recipient. The fact that threats do not al-
10. At the most general level, threats are simply statements of the speaker's present in-
tention to do something in the future. Hence, the word threat includes both statements of 
intent to cause physical harm and statements of intent to do other unpleasant things - for 
example, one can threaten to go public with embarrassing information about a person or 
threaten to withhold one's business from a company that will not meet one's demands. 
This Note uses the term threat to refer only to those threats that are encompassed by 18 
U.S.C. § 871 et seq. (1994) - in other words, those that involve a statement of intent to kill 
or inflict bodily harm on someone. See supra note 1. Other kinds of threats may run afoul of 
laws prohibiting extortion or blackmail, but they are beyond the scope of this Note. 
11. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (stating that these harms - along 
with "the disruption that fear engenders" - are the reason why threats are not speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment); see also Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (construing 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1962) and stating that "[p]lainly, 
threats may be costly and dangerous to society in a variety of ways .... [A] serious threat on 
the President's life is enormously disruptive and involves substantial costs .••• § 871 was 
intended to prevent not simply attempts on the President's life, but also the harm associated 
with the threat itself''). 
12. Courts' refusal to consider risk creation at the criminal-liability stage contrasts 
sharply with the central role that risk creation plays at the sentencing stage. At sentencing, 
the risk created by a threat is an important determinant of the length of the convicted threat-
ener's sentence. For instance, the sentencing guideline that applies to threats specifically 
states that the "seriousness" of a threat "depends upon ... the likelihood that the defendant 
would carry out the threat." USSG § 2A6.1 comment. (backg'd.); see infra section III.A. But 
in deciding whether a threat is punishable at all, courts ignore risk creation and focus exclu-
sively on fear creation. 
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ways create risk raises serious questions regarding the propriety of 
categorically characterizing them as "violent crimes."13 
Section I.A looks at federal threat cases and observes that fed-
eral courts are indifferent to whether a threatener had the intention 
or the ability to carry out his threat. Because these are the two 
most important indicators of whether a threat created any genuine 
risk of harm, this section concludes that the creation of risk is not 
an essential element of a punishable threat under existing law. Sec-
tion I.B observes that federal courts regard fear as an essential ele-
ment of a punishable threat because the creation of fear 
distinguishes "true threats" from nonpunishable jokes, hyperbole, 
and political speech. 
A. The Irrelevance of Risk for Determining Criminal Liability 
Notwithstanding the fact that the utterance of a threat theoreti-
cally creates a risk that the threatener will act in accordance with 
his stated intent, courts are indifferent to this risk when they decide 
whether or not a particular speech act is a punishable threat. 
Courts adamantly refuse to consider either of the two factors that 
could help them determine the degree of risk created by a threat:14 
the threatener's objective ability to carry out his threat and his sub-
jective intent to carry out his threat.ls 
13. See infra Part II (arguing, based on the definition of the word violence, that riskless 
threats should not be considered violent). 
14. These two factors are the most important risk indicators because a threat could not 
actually be carried out unless both are satisfied. For further discussion of this point, see infra 
section IV.A. 
15. See United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994) ("The district court 
correctly determined that ... [t]he government bore no burden of proving that Himelwright 
intended his calls to be threatening or that he had an ability at the time to carry out the 
threats."); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 1064 n.3 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[I]n a prosecution 
under section 875(c), the government need not prove intent (or ability) to carry out the 
threat."), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1826 (1995); United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1324 
(8th Cir.) ("Sections 871 and 876 'recognize ... that it is the making of the threat that is 
prohibited without regard to the maker's subjective intention to carry out the threat.' " 
(quoting United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1991))), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
337 (1993); United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 266 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he government need 
not prove Cox's subjective intent •... "); United States v. Orozco-Santillion, 903 F.2d 1262, 
1265 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The only intent requirement is that the defendant intentionally or 
knowingly communicates his threat, not that he intended or was able to carry out his 
threat."); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he government is 
not required to establish that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat."), cert. 
denied, 481U.S.1005 (1987); see also 2 EDWARD J. DEvrrr ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRAcnCE 
AND lNSTRucnoNs § 33.04, at 305 (4th ed. 1990) ("The government is not required to prove 
that the defendant actually intended to carry out any threat or even that the defendant was 
then able to carry out any such threat.''); FEDERAL JuDICIAL Crn., PATIERN CRIMINAL JURY 
lNSTRucnoNs 95 (1988) ("It is not necessary that [the defendant] intended to carry out the 
threat."). 
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The Ninth Circuit's approach in United States v. Mitchell16 pro-
vides an apt example of the irrelevance of risk in determining crimi-
nal liability for a threat. Mitchell was detained at the Honolulu 
International Airport by customs officials and, while in detention, 
identified himself as Mahatma Gandhi and the son of Nehru and 
also boasted that he had a guerrilla army in the Philippines.17 
Mitchell then threatened to kill President Reagan by drowning him 
in the Atlantic Ocean, which led to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 871 for threatening the President.1s In sustaining the conviction, 
the Ninth Circuit rejected Mitchell's claims that his threat was " 'lu-
dicrous and made in jest' " and that he was incapable of carrying it 
out.19 The court noted that "[t]he agents who heard the statements 
apparently took them quite seriously,"20 and - notwithstanding 
the formidable logistical barriers to Mitchell's presidential-
drowning scheme - disregarded his inability to carry out the threat 
by observing that " 'the threat itself is the crime.' "21 The degree of 
risk posed by the threat was not a factor in the decision. 
B. The Importance of Fear 
Although it is not necessary for a threat to create risk, courts 
have held that threats must have a reasonable tendency to create 
fear in the recipient in order to be punishable.22 The creation-of-
16. 812 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1987). 
17. See 812 F.2d at 1252. 
18. See 812 F.2d at 1253. 
19. 812 F.2d at 1256. 
20. 812 F.2d at 1255. The agents were obviously unfamiliar with the non-violent teach-
ings of Mahatma Gandhi. 
21. 812 F.2d at 1256 (quoting United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 462 (9th Cir. 1984)), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165 (1985). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1324 (8th Cir.) (noting that 
threats are " 'disruptive of the recipient's sense of personal safety and well-being' " and as-
serting that this harm "'is the true gravamen of the offense'" (quoting United States v. 
Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 501U.S.1234 (1991))), cert. denied, 114 S. 
Ct. 337 (1993); United States v. Cox, 957 F.2d 264, 266 (6th Cir. 1992) (reasoning that "a 
threat is not to be construed as conditional if it had a reasonable tendency to create appre-
hension"); United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1976) ("In order to convict 
... the jury had to ... find that the statements ••. were 'an expression of an intent to inflict' 
injury, of 'such a nature as could reasonably induce fear.' "), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1022 
(1978); United States v. Bozeman, 495 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir. 1974) ("[Defendant's] state-
ment meets the test of what amounts to a threat under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), i.e., '[this] commu-
nication in its context would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its 
originator will act according to its tenor.'" (quoting United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 
296, 301 (D. Mont. 1969), affd., 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970))); see also Romualdo P. Eclavea, 
Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 USCS § 875(c) Prohibiting Trans-
mission in Interstate Commerce of Any Communication Containing Any Threat to Kidnap 
Any Person or Any Threat to Injure the Person of Another, 34 A.L.R. FED. 785, 793 (1977) 
("[T]he test for determining whether a communication contains a 'threat' within the meaning 
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) is whether such communication ••• could reasonably have induced fear 
in its recipient."). 
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fear requirement is essential to distinguish "true threats" from 
jokes, hyperbole, and political speech, all of which are protected by 
the First Amendment.23 Some courts do not refer specifically to the 
fear or apprehension experienced by the recipient of a threat, but 
they emphasize that the characterization of speech as a threat may 
depend on whether the recipient reasonably perceived it as such.24 
At any rate, it is clear that the reasonable or actual reaction of the 
recipient of threatening speech is an important consideration for 
courts trying to decide whether to punish a defendant for making 
threats. · 
The Sixth Circuit's approach in United States v. Cox25 is a good 
example of the importance of fear creation in threat cases. Cox, 
who was delinquent in his truck loan payments, telephoned the 
bank that had ordered the repossession of his truck and stated, "I 
tell you what, you all better have my personal items to me by five 
o'clock today or it[']s going to be a lot of hurt people there."26 Af-
ter being convicted of knowingly transmitting in interstate com-
merce a communication containing a threat,27 Cox challenged his 
23. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (stating that threats are 
distinguishable from speech protected by the First Amendment because they create fear, and 
this fear engenders disruption); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969) ("What is 
a threat must be distinguished from what is constitutionally protected speech .... [18 U.S.C. 
§ 871(a) (1962)] initially requires the Government to prove a true 'threat.' We do not believe 
that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term."); 
Ketner, 534 F.2d at 1025 (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to a threat conviction in a 
case where the jury found that the defendant's statements were of" 'such a nature as could 
reasonably induce fear' "). 
Commonly used jury instructions for threat cases confirm the importance of distinguish-
ing threats from protected speech. Juries are instructed: 
A threat is a statement expressing an intention to kill or injure •.. as distinguished 
from a political argument, or talk, or jest. 
The government must prove ... that the defendant ... made a statement in such a 
way and under such circumstances that a reasonable person would foresee that the state-
ment would be interpreted by persons hearing it •.. as a serious expression of an inten-
tion to kill, kidnap, or inflict bodily harm .... 
2 DEVIIT ET AL., supra note 15, § 33.04; see also FEDERAL JUDICIAL Cra., supra note 15, at 
95 ("For you to find [the defendant] guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that ... [the 
defendant communicated] words intending them to be taken as a serious threat and not 
merely as a joke or exaggeration."). 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Himelwright, 42 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he gov-
ernment bore only the burden of proving that Himelwright acted knowingly and willfully 
when he placed the threatening telephone calls and that those calls were reasonably perceived 
as threatening bodily injury." (emphasis added)); United States v. Lincoln, 462 F.2d 1368, 
1369 (6th Cir.) ("'This Court therefore construes [18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1962)] ..• to require 
only that the defendant intentionally make a statement ... under such circumstances wherein 
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted .•. as a serious 
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm .... " (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 
F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969))), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 952 (1972). 
25. 957 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1992). 
26. 957 F.2d at 265. 
27. See 951 F.2d at 265. The statute under which Cox was convicted was 18 U.S.C. 
§ 875(c) (1986). 
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conviction on the ground - among others - that his threat was 
conditional and equivocal. The court noted that there was some 
authority for the proposition that conditional statements were pro-
tected by the First Amendment.2B The court held, however, that "a 
threat is not to be construed as conditional if it had a reasonable 
tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act in ac-
cordance with its tenor." The court then concluded that the people 
at the bank who had been the targets of Cox's threat "reasonably 
would be apprehensive" and "had reason to feel threatened."29 Be-
cause Cox's threat created reasonable fear, his conviction was 
affirmed. 
II. THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE 
At sentencing, the Guidelines require courts to decide whether a 
criminal act was a non-violent offense or a crime of violence. These 
determinations govern the applicability of the reduced mental ca-
pacity and career offender provisions to the defendant. In order to 
decide whether a threat fits within the meaning of either of these 
formulations of the word violence, its meaning must first be ascer-
tained. 30 Accordingly, this Part examines the meaning of violence 
as that term is used by dictionaries, courts, and statutes. 
Section II.A argues that despite the theoretical debate about the 
meaning of violence, dictionaries, both lay and legal, and courts 
agree on a general definition: the use of physical force so as to 
injure, damage, or abuse. Section II.B demonstrates that courts 
have expanded the dictionary definition to include acts that create 
risk of the use of physical force because statutes defining the terms 
violent felony and crime of violence have focused on risk as a key 
determinant of whether an act was violent. 
A. The General Definition of Violence 
1. Dictionaries 
Although it is customary for scholars writing about violence to 
bewail the lack of a precise definition of the word violence,31 and 
28. See 951 F.2d at 265-66 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 {1969)). 
29. 957 F.2d at 266. 
30. The reduced mental capacity provision - § 5K2.13 - provides no definition or 
cross-reference for its use of the term non-violent offense, so this analysis of the general legal 
meaning of violence is an essential starting point. 
The career offender provision - § 4Bl.2 - provides a definition of the term crime of 
violence, which the Note analyzes at length infra in section III.C. While this statutory defini-
tion obviously controls the meaning of violence for purposes of the career offender provision, 
to the extent that the definition is ambiguous, the general legal meaning of violence may 
provide helpful interpretive guidance. 
31. One commentator states: 
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even to despair of the possibility of adequately defining the term,32 
dictionaries - both lay and legal - provide a clear and fairly uni-
form definition: violence is the use of physical force so as to injure, 
damage, or abuse. Black's Law Dictim;zary uses precisely this for-
mulation.33 The Oxford English Dictionary defines violence as 
"[t]he exercise of physical force so as to inflict injury on, or cause 
damage to, persons or property."34 Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary likewise views violence as the "exertion of 
any physical force so as to injure or abuse."35 
2. How Courts Apply the Dictionary Definition 
The dictionary definition of violence is obviously only a starting 
point. Lawyers and judges have long condemned overreliance on 
dictionaries in attempting to define legal terms.36 Courts rarely are 
Violence is the nemesis of law-makers, for violence has a law of its own. Violence 
resists definition because it is protean, a thing of many forms .... Even when some 
definition is arrived at, violence evades the snares of law. The subtler, psychological 
forms of violence are difficult to place before the courts, requiring as they do some overt 
act; violence, for us, must be at least minimally apparent. 
Wilson Carey McWilliams, On Violence and Legitimacy, 19 YALE LJ. 623, 627 (1970). 
For similar comments, see WILUAM IAN MILLER, HuMIUATION 54, 91 (1993) (describing 
violence as "a problematic analytical category" and as "an easy conceptual dumping ground 
for everything ranging from sport to child abuse"); JoHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLlNICAL TECHNIQUES 23-25 {1981) (describing some of the 
various ways in which violence has been defined); and Thomm Kevin Roberts et al., Psycho-
logical Aspects of the Etiology of Violence, in VIOLENCE AND TiiE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 10 
(J. Ray Hays et al. eds., 1981) ("The first thing one is struck by is the ambiguity of the term 
violence ...• '[N]o definition of violence has ever proved completely successful.'" (citation 
omitted)); see also HARRIS, supra note 5, at 11-12 (expressing surprise at the lack of agree-
ment about the meaning of violence). 
Interestingly, several of these - and other - commentators overcome the conceptual 
difficulty of defining the term violence and offer definitions that, like the dictionary defini-
tions, are focused on the use of physical force to injure. See, e.g., MILLER, supra, at 59-60 
(asserting that "[m]ost violent interaction falls into the category of the easy case, about which 
no sane person would dispute the appropriateness of the interaction being labeled violent 
..•. Violence is force, but force characterized variously by suddenness, uncertain warrant, 
the capacity to induce terror." (footnote omitted)); Marvin E. Wolfgang, Sociocultural Over-
view of Criminal Violence, in VIOLENCE AND TiiE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, supra, at 97, 98 ("I 
shall use the term violence to refer to the intentional use of physical force on another person 
.... "). 
32. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 5, at 12 (citing Robert Paul Wolff, On Violence, 66 J. 
PHIL. 602 (1969)). 
33. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1570 (6th ed. 1990) (defining violence as 
"[u]njust or unwarranted exercise of force ...• Physical force unlawfully exercised ..•. The 
exertion of any physical force so as to injure, damage or abuse"). 
34. OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY 654 (2d ed. 1989). 
35. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2554 (unabridged 1986). 
36. See, e.g., Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J.) (stating that "it is 
one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out 
of the dictionary"), affd., 326 U.S. 404 (1945). 
On the other hand, it is hardly an irrational response to a lexical ambiguity to start by 
looking at the dictionary definition of the word in question. This approach has been en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court, in deed if not explicitly in word. See Note, Looking It Up: 
Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1437, 1438 (1994) (discussing 
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confronted with a need to provide a definition for violence, so even 
though judicial opinions use the term with astonishing frequency,37 
few cases explain what it means,38 When the courts do so, however, 
they have assigned it the same basic meaning as the dictionaries: 
the use of physical force so as to injure or abuse.39 
An example of a court that adhered rather strictly to the dic-
tionary definition is Abernathy v. Conroy. 40 In Abernathy, the 
Fourth Circuit confronted a void-for-vagueness challenge to South 
Carolina's common law definition of riot. The common law defined 
a riot as " 'a tumultuous disturbance of the peace, by three or more 
persons assembled together ... putting their design into execution 
in a terrific and violent manner.' "41 In response to the allegation 
that the reference to "violent" conduct was impermissibly vague, 
the court stated that " 'violence' is defined as the 'exertion of physi-
cal force so as to injure or abuse,' " and asserted that the average 
citizen would understand the term violence in this way.42 
the Court's increasing use of dictionaries and observing that dictionary definitions were used 
in 28% of the cases decided by the Court during its 1992 Term). 
37. A search in the ALLFEDS database on Westlaw reveals that in the first six months of 
1995, 19,098 cases used the words violence or violent, excluding uses of the terms of art 
"crime of violence" and "violent felony"; the search terms for this were: violenl % "crime of 
violence" % "violent felony" and da(aft 1-1-95) and da(bef 7-1-95). 
38. One particularly egregious example of this failure to define violence is NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), which made 86 references to "violence" or 
"violent" without ever explaining what either meant. 
39. A number of state cases that have had to define violence based their definitions on 
those employed by dictionaries, or focused on the importance of physical force to the mean-
ing of the term, or both. See, e.g., State v. Szymkiewicz, 652 A.2d 523, 525 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1995) ("We have construed the words 'violent or threatening behavior' in this statute to mean 
'conduct which actually involves physical violence or portends imminent physical vio-
lence.' "); Eby v. State, 290 N.E.2d 89, 97 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (using Webster's New Interna-
tional Dictionary to define violence as " 'the exertion of any physical force considered with 
reference to its effect on another"); Conroy v. City of Boston, 465 N.E.2d 775, 777 & n.3 
(Mass. 1984) (referring to both Webster's Third New International Dictionary and Black's 
Law Dictionary in defining violence as the "exertion of any physical force so as to injure or 
abuse"); Utica Fire Ins. Co. v. Teschner's Tavern, No. 66942, 1995WL106128, at *2 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Mar. 9, 1995) (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary as defining violence as the 
"exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse"); Smith v. State, 737 P.2d 1206, 1215 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (relying on Webster's New World Dictionary and holding that a rape 
committed with the use of force or fear is a "violent crime"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 673 
(1994); State v. O'Connell, 510 A.2d 167, 171 (Vt. 1986) (using Webster's New International 
Dictionary to conclude that " 'unjust or improper force' may also constitute violence"). 
While this Note is concerned primarily with federal law regarding threats and violence, 
given the paucity of federal cases discussing the meaning of violence, the foregoing state cases 
are helpful in showing how courts typically understand the word violence. They also demon-
strate that Abernathy v. Conroy, a case discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 40-42, 
is not an aberration. 
40. 429 F.2d 1170 (4th Cir. 1970). 
41. 429 F.2d at 1174-75 (quoting State v. Connolly, 18 S.C.L. (3 Rich.) 337, 338 (1832)). 
42. 429 F.2d at 1175 (quoting Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary and stating 
that "violence is a term with which twentieth century Americans are particularly well-
acquainted .... When the terms are seen in the context of the whole definition, they plainly 
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Other federal courts using the term violence likewise have ar-
ticulated a view of violence that reflects the centrality of physical 
force to its meaning. For instance, in an involuntary servitude case 
where "physical force" was an element of the offense, the First Cir-
cuit upheld a jury instruction stating that " '[p ]hysical force includes 
restraint, physical restraint .... It includes the notion of compul-
sion, coercion, power, violence.' "43 In another particularly colorful 
example, United States v. Jennings, 44 the court had to evaluate the 
conduct of a defendant who had punched his court-appointed coun-
sel, knocking him to the floor.45 The court commented: "Having 
decided that the use of physical force within the walls of the court-
house simply is unacceptable, the question remains how to react to 
the use of violence .... "46 These statements do not prove conclu-
sively that violence is limited to the use of physical force or the risk 
thereof, but they do reveal that courts, like the dictionaries, think of 
violence as directly related to physical force. 
B. Risk Creation as a Type of Violence 
Not many federal courts besides the Abernathy court have had 
occasion to offer a complete definition of violence. This void has 
been filled to some extent by statutory definitions of the term vio-
lent felony - added to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) by 
amendment47 - and the term crime of violence in the career of-
fender provision of the Guidelines. These statutory definitions have 
firmly established risk of the use of physical force as a type of 
violence.48 
suggest to the average citizen noisy, frightening conduct accompanied by harmful physical 
force"). 
43. United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994, 1001 (1st Cir. 1995). 
44. 855 F. Supp. 1427 (M.D. Pa. 1994). 
45. See 855 F. Supp. at 1440. The defendant further provoked the wrath of the court by 
informing the U.S. Marshalls who were restraining him that his original plan had been "to 
lean close for a whispered consultation, then to bite counsel's ear off." 855 F. Supp. at 1440 
n.9. 
46. 855 F. Supp. at 1444. For another example of a linkage between physical force and 
violence, see the Federal Pattern Jury Instruction for "excessive force," which says: "[E]very 
person has the right not to be subjected to unreasonable or excessive force while being ar-
rested •... Whether or not the force used in making an arrest was unnecessary, unreasonable 
or violent is an issue to be determined by you .... " 3 DEvrrr ET AL., supra note 15, § 103.08, 
at 961. 
47. Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1402(b), 100 Stat. 
3207, 3207-39 to -40 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1994)). 
48. In a sense, the inclusion of risk creation within the meaning of violence is implicit in 
the more general definition as well. All of the dictionary definitions discussed supra empha-
size the link between the actor's conduct and the harmful outcome - the conduct must be 
undertaken "so as" to cause injury or damage. This linkage provides some justification for 
considering risk-creating conduct, which has a tendency to result in injury or damage, as 
within the scope of the term violence. 
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The ACCA and the career offender provision are both designed 
to impose particularly severe penalties on certain classes of 
criminals: the ACCA focuses on those who committed violent felo-
nies while armed,49 while the career offender provision applies 
more generally to anyone convicted of three crimes of violence.so 
The definitions of these two terms are nearly identical, and both 
expressly include "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another."51 In light of these definitions, courts 
consider various crimes to be violent felonies for purposes of the 
ACCA or crimes of violence for purposes of the career offender 
provision, if they involve physical force or the risk thereof.52 A cir-
cuit split that arose regarding the status of attempted burglary as a 
The inclusion of risk creation within the meaning of violence also prevents some concep-
tual absurdities. If risk creation were not included, for instance, the placement of a bomb in a 
public place would not be a violent act if the bomb were detected and disarmed before it 
exploded - there would have been no use of physical force. The bomber's conduct, how-
ever, is the same whether the bomb is detected and disarmed or whether it explodes with 
great physical force. It makes little sense to classify his attempted bombing as "non-violent" 
simply because it was unsuccessful. Similarly, if a threat creates risk of the use of force but 
does not result in any force actually being used, the risk itself may be enough to characterize 
the threat as "violent." 
49. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(l) (1994) (prohibiting courts from suspending sentences or 
granting probation to offenders with three previous convictions for "violent felonies" and 
setting 15-years imprisonment as the minimum sentence for such offenders). 
50. See USSG §§ 4Bl.1 to .2. 
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1994); USSG § 4Bl.2(1)(ii). For a discussion of the 
importance of risk creation to the crime of violence definition, see infra section IIl.C. 
52. With respect to the ACCA, see, for example, United States v. Mack, 8 F.3d 1109, 1112 
(6th Cir. 1993) ("[D]efendant's prior convictions for sexual battery are not 'violent felonies' 
... because they do not necessarily involve physical force ..•. We decline to hold that sexual 
conduct with someone •.. unaware of the nonconsensual nature of the act 'involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.' "), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 
153 (1995); United States v. Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir. 1993) (adopting an earlier hold· 
ing "that attempted breaking and entering under Maryland law qualified as a violent felony 
because the risk of confrontation, and physical harm, created when someone interrupts an 
intruder in the process of breaking in is nearly as great as the risk created when an interrup-
tion occurs after access is gained"), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 1194 (1994); United States v. King, 
979 F.2d 801, 804 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that a conspiracy to commit armed robbery is not 
a "violent felony" because, unlike a completed armed robbery, conspiracy does " 'not neces-
sarily present circumstances which [create a] high risk of violent confrontation'" (quoting 
United States v. Strahl, 969 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992))); United States v. Payne, 966 F.2d 4, 9 
(1st Cir. 1992) (holding that attempted breaking and entering is a "violent felony" because 
"the defendant will have [to] come close enough to someone else's premises to risk a con-
frontation likely to result in violence"); and United States v. Martinez, 954 F.2d 1050, 1054 
n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that attempted burglary is not a "violent felony" because "the 
crime of attempted burglary simply cannot be said to present the sort of categorical danger of 
serious risk of injury to others that is required to count an offense as a 'violent felony' "). 
With respect to the career offender provision, see, for example, United States v. 
Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir.) (holding that drunk driving is a "crime of violence" 
because it inherently creates a risk of physical injury), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 323 (1995); 
United States v. Weinert, 1 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that shooting at a dwelling 
is a "crime of violence" because it presents a risk); United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 
569, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that robbery is a "crime of violence" because it presents a 
risk), cert denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991). 
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"violent felony" under the ACCA is illustrative in this regard. 
Although the circuits came to different results, they both analyzed 
the issue in terms of whether the crime created risk of the use of 
physical force and injury to others.53 
III. THE MEANING OF VIOLENCE IN THE REDUCED MENTAL 
CAPACITY AND CAREER OFFENDER PROVISIONS 
Under the definition of violence favored by both the courts and 
the dictionaries - the use or risk of the use of physical force so as 
to injure, damage, or abuse54 - it is clear that not all threats are 
violent because threats do not involve physical force,55 and some 
threats do not even create risk of the use of physical force.56 This 
Part considers whether this understanding of when threats are vio-
lent should be applied to the reduced mental capacity and career 
offender provisions. Section III.A argues that it is desirable to dis-
tinguish risk-creating threats from riskless threats when deciding 
whether they are violent for sentencing purposes. Risk-creating 
threats cause a different and greater harm than riskless threats, so it 
makes sense to impose greater punishment on those making risk-
creating threats. Section III.B contends that the language and pur-
poses of the reduced mental capacity provision indicate that courts 
should consider riskless threats "non-violent offenses." Section 
III.C asserts that the career offender provision's definition of 
"crime of violence" should be understood to exclude riskless 
threats because the provision was designed to include crimes that 
inherently create risk of the use of physical force, and threats do not 
inherently create such risk. 
A. The Desirability of Distinguishing Between Risk-Creating and 
Riskless Threats 
Characterizing riskless threats as "non-violent" and risk-
creating threats as "violent" is not just a matter of definitional accu-
racy. It also achieves the Guidelines's goal of prescribing different 
punishments for crimes that result in different harms.57 Threats are 
53. Compare Thomas, 2 F.3d at 80 {holding that attempted burglary is a "violent felony" 
because it creates a risk of physical harm) with Martinez, 954 F.2d at 1054 n.3 {holding that 
attempted burglary is not a "violent felony" because it does not present a serious risk of 
injury). 
54. See supra Part II. 
55. Threats are speech acts, which in themselves involve no use of force. See supra note 
6. 
56. See supra Part I. 
57. See, e.g., USSG § 1Bl.3{a){3) (stating that the "relevant conduct" for purposes of 
deciding the base offense level for a crime includes "all harm that resulted from the acts and 
omissions ••• and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions"). 
The Guidelines also refer to the objective of tailoring the punishment of crimes to the 
degree of harm caused by reference to the more general goal of "proportionality." See, e.g., 
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punishable because, irrespective of risk creation, they cause a harm 
that society desires to prevent: fear.58 Sometimes, but not always, 
threats also cause a second harm - risk of the use of physical force. 
Consequently, a definition of violence that enables courts to impose 
different sentences on these two classes of threats - those that are 
merely frightening and those that are both frightening and risky -
is desirable because the latter causes a different and greater harm.59 
Furthermore, the Guidelines specifically recognize that different 
degrees of risk creation are important in imposing sentences on 
threateners. In section 2A6.1, which prescribes sentences for 
"Threatening Communications," the Commission commented: 
"[Threat] statutes cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of 
which depends upon the defendant's intent and the likelihood that 
the defendant would carry out the threat."60 
B. The Reduced Mental Capacity Provision 
The reduced mental capacity provision permits a court to grant 
a sentence reduction to a defendant suffering from reduced mental 
capacity only if the defendant committed a "non-violent offense."61 
The Guidelines do not provide a definition for the term "non-
USSG Ch.1, Pt.A (3), p.s. ("Congress sought proportionality in sentencing through a system 
that imposes appropriately different sentences for criminal conduct of differing severity."). 
Achieving proportionality in criminal sentences is not discretionary: it is constitutionally 
mandated. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) ("The Eighth Amendment declares: 
'Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.' The final clause prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also 
sentences that are disproportionate to the crime committed."). 
58. See supra section J.B. The harm of fear creation encompasses a number of related 
harms, such as illnesses that may be caused by anxiety, and the cost of inefficient behavior 
that threat recipients engage in as a response to a threat. See Steven Shaven, An Economic 
Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmai~ Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1877 (1993) (describing the anxiety and inefficient conduct that threats induce). For 
example, a threat recipient might become clinically depressed as a result of prolonged anxi-
ety or might quit his job if the threat related to his workplace conduct. These kinds of harms 
- in addition to simple anxiety - are among those that we seek to prevent by criminalizing 
threats. 
59. For an endorsement of this reasoning, see Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, which states: 
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be 
guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense •••• 
Application of [this] factor[] assumes that courts are competent to judge the gravity 
of an offense, at least on a relative scale. In a broad sense this assumption is justified, 
and courts have traditionally made these judgments - just as legislatures must make 
them in the first instance. Comparisons can be made in light of the harm caused or 
threatened to the victim or society, and the culpability of the offender. 
See also Frederick M. Lawrence, The Punishment of Hate: Toward a Normative Theory of 
Bias-Motivated Crimes, 93 MICH. L. REv. 320, 354 (1994) ("1\vo elements of a crime describe 
its seriousness: the culpability of the offender and the harm caused to society. Murder, for 
example, is a more serious crime than intentional assault because of the harm caused." (foot-
notes omitted)). 
60. USSG § 2A6.l, comment. (backg'd.). 
61. See USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. 
February 1996] Note - Are Threats Always "Violent"? 1081 
violent offense," which seems to suggest that the term should be 
given its ordinary legal meaning62 - an offense not involving the 
use or risk of the use of force. 63 
This interpretation is reinforced by other language in the provi-
sion denying sentence reductions to defendants whose criminal his-
tories "indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public. "64 
The decision to include this limitation indicates that the reduced 
mental capacity provision as a whole is concerned about risk 
presented by the defendant. Defendants whose past offenses 
demonstrate risk creation are barred from sentence reductions by 
the "criminal history" limitation. Defendants whose instant of-
fenses involved risk are denied sentence reductions based on the 
"non-violent offense" requirement. Understood in this way, the 
two provisions work toward a common goal, and the reduced 
mental capacity provision sends a consistent message: leniency is 
appropriate when a person committed a crime while suffering from 
reduced mental capacity but did not create any real risk to any-
one. 65 Under this approach, therefore, a riskless threat should 
qualify as a "non-violent offense." 
The only reason that has been suggested for understanding non-
violent offense to have other than its customary legal meaning is 
that the Guidelines provide a definition for "crime of violence" in 
the career offender provision. Some courts have decided that be-
cause both terms contain the same root word - violence - a "non-
violent offense" should be understood as anything that is not a 
crime of violence.66 Because courts generally assume that all 
62. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CoNSTRUcnoN § 47.28, at 248 
(5th ed. 1992) ("Many cases hold that words in a statute are to be given their common mean-
ing . . • • Many cases state the rule in terms of a presumption favoring the common meaning 
in the absence of evidence that some other meaning was intended or manifested." (footnotes 
omitted)). 
63. See supra Part II. 
64. USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. 
65. See United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Chatman, 986 F2d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[T]he term 'non-violent offense' in section 
5K2.13 refers to those offenses that, in the act, reveal that a defendant is not dangerous 
••. . ");see also United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., 
dissenting) ("[T]he Commission has not required judges to treat the innocuous threatener 
and the murderous one identically ..•. When prison is not justified by the need to incapaci-
tate the defendant, § 5K2.13 is available."). 
66. The leading case taking this approach is Poff; other cases are collected supra in note 
9. The Poff court focused on the fact that the Sentencing Commission used the same root 
word - violence - in both the career offender and reduced mental capacity provisions. The 
court then concluded that the defendant could not meet her burden of showing that the 
Commission meant something different by the two uses of violence because "when the same 
word appears in different, though related sections, that word likely bears the same meaning 
in both instances." 926 F.2d at 591. The court never explains how the career offender and 
reduced mental capacity provisions are "related." 
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threats to use physical force are crimes of violence,67 cross-applying 
the crime of violence definition to the reduced mental capacity pro-
vision would mean that a threat never could be considered a non-
violent offense. This cross-application of the crime of violence defi-
nition, however, is inappropriate in light of the structure and text of 
the Guidelines and the different policy goals of the two provisions. 
First, the structure and text of the Guidelines suggest that the 
Sentencing Commission's decision to use different terms in the two 
provisions means that different meanings were intended.68 At the 
beginning of the Guidelines, the Commission specifies some defini-
tions that it intends to have "general applicability."69 The crime of 
violence definition is not among these. The Guidelines then pro-
vide explicit cautionary language regarding the cross-application of 
other definitions that were not designated for "general applicabil-
ity": "Definitions of terms also may appear in other sections. Such 
definitions are not designed for general applicability; therefore, their 
applicability to sections other than those expressly referenced must 
be determined on a case by case basis."70 This language seems to 
place the burden of persuasion squarely upon those who advocate 
the cross-application of a definition in an instance where the Sen-
tencing Commission has declined to do so.71 
67. See, e.g., United States v. Butt, No. 92-5701, 1994 WL 4671, at *4 (4th Cir. Jan. 6) 
(stating that "courts have held threats to be crimes of violence under § 4Bl.2"), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 1861 (1994); Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 ("According to some courts •.. a crime 
[should] be characterized as one 'of violence' within the meaning of section 4Bl.2 if any one 
of the crime's statutory elements involves merely the 'threatened use of physical force' 
against a person, regardless of the specific facts of the crime." (citing United States v. Wilson, 
951 F.2d 586, 588 (4th Cir. 1991))), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2294 (1992); United States v. 
Hunter, 985 F.2d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 1993) (asserting that threats to kill and assault are 
crimes of violence); Poff, 926 F.2d at 590 ("Appellant admitted that she threatened President 
Reagan ... and her prior convictions required the trial judge to apply the career offender 
provision of the Guidelines .... "(citing United States v. McCaleb, 908 F.2d 176, 178 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (stating that threats are crimes of violence))). 
The assumption that all threats are crimes of violence arises from the language of the 
crime of violence definition, which appears to include "any offense ••. that has as an element 
the ... threatened use of physical force." USSG § 4Bl.2(1). This Note challenges this as-
sumption infra in section III.C. 
68. Cf. Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) (concluding that Con-
gress's decision to use different wording in two "simultaneously adopted" subsections of an 
act reflects an intent to convey different meanings). 
In an ordinary statute, one might argue that Congress's choice of slightly different formu-
lations is indicative of mere oversight rather than a deliberate distinction. But as the 
Chatman court observes, the Guidelines " 'were written as a unit •.. and with greater than 
customary attention to the relation among sections ...• Amendments numbering [473] over 
[five] years attest to a·continuous effort to make the text and notes an integrated whole.'" 
Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1450 (alterations in original) (quoting Poff, 926 F.2d at 594 
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting)). 
69. See USSG § lBl.1, comment. (n.1). 
70. USSG § lBl.1, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). 
71. The dissent in Poff employed similar reasoning: 
It would have been easy to write § 5K2.13 to say that the judge may depart unless the 
defendant committed a 'crime of violence' as§ 4Bl.2 defines it; instead the Commission 
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Second, the policy goals of the career offender and reduced 
mental capacity provisions are different, suggesting that cross-
application of the crime of violence definition to the reduced 
mental capacity provision is inappropriate. The career offender 
provision gives effect to the congressional mandate that career of-
fenders be punished harshly - that their sentences be "at or near 
the maximum term authorized" by statute.12 Moreover, this provi-
sion is an essential part of the sentencing process. The sentencing 
court must consider whether the defendant qualifies as a career of-
fender when imposing a sentence.73 The reduced mental capacity 
provision, by contrast, seeks to enable courts to give more lenient 
sentences to defendants who suffered from reduced mental capacity 
during the commission of their offense.74 It is also a purely discre-
tionary provision: courts may refuse to consider it if they so de-
sire. 75 Thus, the differences between the career offender and 
reduced mental capacity provisions encompass both distinctive pol-
icy objectives and distinctive usage by courts. These differences 
outweigh the mere fact that cognates of the word violence are used 
in both provisions and render cross-application of the crime of vio-
lence definition to the reduced mental capacity provision 
inappropriate.76 
selected different formulations. Although it laid out a detailed meaning for 'crime of 
violence' in § 4Bl.2, it did not provide so much as a cross-reference in § 5K2.13, a curi-
ous omission if the Commission meant to link these phrases so tightly that they are 
mutually exclusive. 
926 F.2d at 594 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). This reasoning was adopted by Chatman. See 
986 F.2d at 1450 (quoting the above passage and further stating: "The lack of a cross-
reference is all the more significant because so many of the Guidelines use explicit cross-
referencing. For instance, the definition of 'crime of violence' in section 4Bl.2 is expressly 
adopted by section 4Al.1 .... "). 
72. See USSG § 4Bl.1, comment (backg'd.) (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 
175 (1983)). 
73. See USSG § lBl.l{f) (instructing the sentencing court to "[d]etermine from Part B of 
Chapter Four [which includes the career offender provision] any other applicable [sentence] 
adjustments"). 
74. See Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 ("In contrast to the purposes of section 4Bl.2, the 
point of section 5K2.13 is to treat with lenity those individuals whose 'reduced mental capac-
ity' contributed to commission of a crime."); cf. Poff, 926 F.2d at 595 (Easterbrook, J. dissent-
ing) (stating that "[s]ection 5K2.13 read as a whole ..• says that when incapacitation is not an 
important justification for punishment, mental condition may be the basis of a departure"). 
75. The introduction to the chapter in which the reduced mental capacity provision is 
found states: "[T]his subpart seeks to aid the court by identifying some of the factors that the 
Commission has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the guidelines .... 
Presence of any such factor may warrant departure from the guidelines ... in the discretion of 
the sentencing court." USSG § 5K2.0, p.s. (emphases added). 
76. See generally John A. Henderson, Note, A Square Meaning for a Round Phrase: Ap-
plying the Career Offender Provision's "Crime of Violence" to the Diminished Capacity Provi-
sion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1475, 1496-503 (1995) (presenting 
a number of arguments against cross-applying the crime of violence definition to the reduced 
mental capacity provision). 
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Even if one does not accept the argument presented in this sec-
tion, J;iowever, and chooses to cross-apply the crime of violence def-
inition to the reduced mental capacity provision, the next section 
demonstrates that not all threats are crimes of violence. Conse-
quently, regardless of which definition of violence one prefers -
the ordinary legal definition or the crime of violence definition -
at least some threats should qualify as non-violent offenses. 
C. The Career Offender Provision 
Courts that disagree with the argument presented in section 
III.B and hold that threats cannot be non-violent offenses generally 
do so based on two premises: (1) they believe that the definition of 
crime of violence controls the meaning of non-violent offense, and 
(2) they believe that all threats are crimes of violence, and therefore 
no threat can be a non-violent offense.77 Even if one accepts the 
first premise - in spite of the arguments presented in section III.B 
- this section contends that the second premise is erroneous. 
This section argues that the crime of violence definition should 
be understood to exclude riskless threats because risk of physical 
harm is an essential element of crimes of violence. This section 
demonstrates the centrality of risk of physical harm to the crime of 
violence definition78 by examining the language of the definition, its 
history, and the interpretation of the definition by courts. 
Section 4B1.2 defines crime of violence as follows: 
The term "crime of violence" means any offense under federal or 
state law ... that - (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) 
is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explo-
sives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another. 79 
One reasonably could argue, based on a simple examination of the 
language of section (i), that this definition includes all "threatened 
use[s] of physical force."8° Courts that have applied the career of-
77. See supra note 9 (collecting cases). 
78. The crime of violence definition appears in three places: § 4Bl.2 of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1994} - from which the § 4Bl.2 definition was drawn - and 18 
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (1994) - which defines the term violent felony but uses a definition 
very similar to the other two provisions. Given that the definitions set forth in these provi-
sions are identical in all respects relevant to this Note, it generically refers to "the" crime of 
violence definition. 
79. USSG § 4Bl.2(1) (emphasis added}. 
80. This "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation has long been considered 
appropriate as a starting point. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) 
("[T]he meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which 
the act is framed, and if that is plain . . • the sole function of the courts is to enforce it 
according to its terms."); see also 2A SINGER, supra note 62, § 46.01, at 81 (quoting 
Caminetti). 
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fender provision to threat offenses generally have assumed, without 
much analysis, that this interpretation is correct and that therefore 
all threats to use physical force are crimes of violence. 81 
Despite the apparent plausibility of this "plain language" ap-
proach, the language of the definition as a whole, its legislative his-
tory, and the way in which courts have interpreted the definition 
indicate that the better understanding is that the definition only in-
cludes crimes that inherently involve risk.82 The language of the 
"otherwise" clause in section (ii) provides insight into what the 
drafters were trying to accomplish in the crime of violence defini-
tion. Although the "otherwise" clause is attached to section (ii) and 
therefore does not directly control section (i), statutory language 
should be read in the context of the entire statute in which it is 
found,83 so the "otherwise" clause is relevant to understanding the 
meaning of section (i) as well.84 
The "otherwise" clause provides a guide to what the drafters 
sought to accomplish by enumerating specific offenses in section 
(ii): it indicates that they were listing offenses that they felt created 
a serious potential risk of physical injury. The presence of the 
phrase "or otherwise involves ... serious potential risk" reflects the 
drafters' belief that the specific offenses listed in section (ii) were all 
examples of offenses involving serious potential risk. The list of 
specific offenses in section (ii), in turn, is simply a continuation of 
the project started in section (i), which was to identify categories of 
crimes that generally involve risk.85 The "otherwise" clause and the 
Singer cautions, however, against unthinking reliance on the plain language. "Judicial 
frustration, if not usurpation, of legislative authority, may be the result of reflexive judicial 
construction arrived at exclusively by considering the language of the statute ... without 
regard for the purpose of the act and other aids to interpretation." Id. § 45.09, at 42. 
81. See supra note 9 (collecting cases that assume all threats are crimes of violence). 
82. Departure from the apparent "plain meaning" of a statute is clearly permissible under 
these conditions. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of R.R. Passengers, 
414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) (stating that "even the most basic general principles of statutory 
construction must yield to clear contrary evidence of legislative intent"); Harrison v. North-
ern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943) ("[W]ords are inexact tools at best, and for that 
reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no 
matter how clear the words may appear on superficial examination."); see also 2A SINGER, 
supra note 62, § 46.07, at 126-27 ("The literal interpretation of the words of an act should not 
prevail if it creates a result contrary to the apparent intention of the legislature .•.• The 
intention prevails over the letter, and the letter must if possible be read to conform to the 
spirit of the act"). 
83. See 2A SINGER, supra note 62, § 46.05, at 103 ("An instrument must always be con-
strued as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually 
to be ascribed from the context ... and the purpose or intention ••. of the body which 
enacted or framed the statute .... "); id. at 105 (referring to "the cardinal rule that the 
general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control"). 
84. See United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that 
"[s]ections 4Bl.2(i) and (ii) work together"). 
85. This is demonstrated by the fact that the two sections are disjunctive: if an offense 
does not qualify as a crime of violence under § (i), the sentencing court then considers 
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list of specific offenses in section (ii) demonstrate the drafters' de-
sire to ensure that all other crimes involving serious potential risk 
that section (i) overlooked still will qualify as crimes of violence. 
That the "otherwise" clause indicates the statute's intent to en-
compass crimes that create a risk of physical injury is supported by 
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Taylor v. United States. 86 In 
Taylor, the Court analyzed the purpose of the crime of violence def-
inition87 as a prelude to determining the meaning of the term bur-
glary. The Court first quoted a passage from the legislative history 
of the provision indicative of the importance of risk of injury to the 
drafters: "The ... major question involved in these hearings was as 
to what violent felonies involving physical force against property 
should be included in the definition .... The Subcommittee agreed 
to add the crimes ... that involve conduct that presents a serious 
potential risk of physical injury to others."88 The Court then de-
scribed the addition of the word "otherwise" - along with the 
newly enumerated specific offenses - as "critical" to its discussion 
of the definition,89 and concluded that "Congress focused its efforts 
on career offenders - those who . . . present at least a potential 
threat of harm to persons."90 
Moreover, the Taylor Court's analysis demonstrates that the 
drafters of the crime of violence definition did not merely seek to 
include crimes that might involve a risk of the use of physical force; 
rather, they sought to include in the definition those crimes that 
inherently create such risk. The Court noted in its analysis of the 
legislative history of the provision that an unenacted predecessor of 
the current definition explicitly had indicated the drafters' desire to 
include inherently risk-creating crimes. The predecessor statute had 
included any felony "that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
that physical force against the person or property of another may 
be used."91 When an alternative bill was introduced that omitted 
language of this kind - it included only "the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force" - it was criticized sharply for 
whether it might still qualify as one of the specific offenses listed in § (ii). If this fails, the 
court may then consider whether the crime "otherwise involved" risk of physical injury. 
86. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
87. The Court actually was analyzing the definition of violent felony in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (1994) - a provision of the ACCA. The definition of violent felony is exactly 
the same as the crime of violence definition in the career offender provision. See supra note 
78 and accompanying text. 
88. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 849, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986)) 
(emphasis omitted). 
89. See 495 U.S. at 587. 
90. 495 U.S. at 587-88. 
91. 495 U.S. at 583 (emphasis added) (quoting S. 2312, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1986); 
and H.R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1986)). 
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omitting inherently risky property offenses.92 One critic asserted 
that "[i]t is these crimes against property - which are inherently 
dangerous - that we think should be considered as predicate of-
fenses."93 Based on this legislative background - and Congress's 
ultimate decision to include inherently dangerous offenses and the 
"otherwise" clause - the Taylor Court concluded: . 
[T]hroughout the history of the enhancement provision, Congress fo-
cused its efforts on career offenders - those who commit a large 
number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood, and who 
... present at least a potential threat of harm to persons .... 
The legislative history also indicates that Congress singled out bur-
glary ... for inclusion as a predicate offense ... because of its inherent 
potential for harm to persons .... Congress apparently thought that 
all burglaries ... shared this potential for violence .... 94 
The lower courts that addressed the status of burglary prior to 
Taylor likewise focused on the inherent nature of the risk created 
by the crime,95 and courts have applied this focus to other crimes as 
well when deciding whether they should be considered crimes of 
violence.96 
92. 495 U.S. at 584 (describing the criticism of H.R. 4768, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) 
proposing the narrower definition of crime of violence). 
93. 495 U.S at 585 (quoting Armed Career Criminal Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 4639 
and H.R. 4768 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986) (testimony of James Knapp, Deputy Assistant Attorney General)) 
(emphasis added). 
94. 495 U.S. at 587-88 (emphases added). The legislative history of the crime of violence 
definition addresses burglary similarly, saying that burglary is a "crime of violence" because 
"offenses such as burglary .•. involve the substantial risk of physical force against another 
person or against the property." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 307 (1984), reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3487. 
95. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 919 F.2d 568, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[A] 'crime of 
violence' is any felony that inherently involves 'a substantial risk that physical force against 
the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.' First 
degree burglary ... involves just such a risk." (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) 
(1988))), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991); United States v. Davis, 881 F.2d 973, 976 (11th Cir. 
1989) ("[W]e conclude that the burglary of a dwelling by its nature creates a substantial risk 
of physical force ...• The district court, therefore, did not err in concluding that appellant's 
conviction for burglary ••. constituted a crime of violence ..•. " (emphasis added)), cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 1026 (1990); United States v. Flores, 875 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(holding that burglary of a dwelling is a "crime of violence" because "[w]henever a private 
residence is broken into, there is always a substantial risk that force will be used" (emphasis 
added)). 
96. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 375 (7th Cir.) (considering drunk 
driving and stating that" '[c]onjecture' or 'speculation' about possible harm is not sufficient 
to create a crime of violence under § 4Bl.2; instead, there must be evidence that the crime, 
by its nature, presents a substantial risk" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 323 
(1995); United States v. Weinert, 1 F.3d 889, 891 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Thus, it is the risk inherent 
in the act of shooting at an inhabited building, as opposed to the presence of a victim, that 
makes this particular offense a crime of violence." (emphasis added)); United States v. 
McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[R]obbery is 'inherently dangerous' .... 
Clearly •.. robbery as defined in California falls under [the crime of violence definition] as a 
felony that 'by its nature, involves substantial risk' that physical force may be used." ( empha-
ses added)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991); see also United States v. Telesco, 962 F.2d 165, 
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The Sentencing Commission clearly believes that the crime of 
violence definition is intended to encompass inherently risk-creating 
offenses. In its commentary to the career offender provision, the 
Commission expressly identified some crimes as crimes of violence, 
such as murder, manslaughter, and aggravated assault.97 The Com-
mission then echoed the language of the unenacted predecessor 
definition of crime of violence discussed in Taylor, stating: "Other 
offenses are included where ... the conduct set forth (i.e. expressly 
charged) in the count of which the defendant was convicted ... by 
its nature, presented a serious potential risk of injury to another."98 
Given that the crime of violence definition seeks to encompass 
offenses that inherently involve a serious risk of the use of physical 
force, it would thwart this objective to interpret the definition to 
include all threats because threats do not inherently involve risk of 
the use of physical force.99 The intent of the crime of violence pro-
vision would be served best if courts only applied it to those threats 
that create "a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 
To apply the definition to every threatened use of physical force, 
risk-creating or not, extends the statute beyond its intended 
scope.10° 
166 (2d Cir. 1992) ("The Sentencing Commission has thus determined that certain crimes -
regardless of the precise conduct - are inherently violent." (emphasis added)). 
97. See USSG § 4B1.2, comment. (n.2). 
98. USSG § 4B12, comment. (n.2) (emphasis added). Threats are notably absent from 
the Commission's list of crimes of violence, though the Commentary also repeats the passage 
in the text of the career offender provision stating that crimes that have as an element the 
"threatened use of physical force" are crimes of violence. 
99. See supra Part I. 
100. Cf. 2B SINGER, supra note 62, § 54.06, at 260-61 ("When the natural or literal mean-
ing of statutory language embraces applications which would not serve the policy or purpose 
for which the statute was enacted •.. the courts may construe it restrictively in order not to 
give it an effect beyond its equity or spirit."). 
Singer cites as an example of this principle Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 
U.S. 457 (1892), in which the Court employed reasoning nearly identical to that advocated by 
this Note. In Holy Trinity, the Court was forced to construe a statute making it unlawful for 
any business to pay the expenses of a foreigner to come to the United States "to perform 
labor or service of any kind." 143 U.S. at 458 (emphasis added). The church had hired a 
minister from abroad to come and preach to its congregation but argued that it should be 
excepted from the reach of the Act. Confronted with the Government's argument that the 
statute on its face permitted no exceptions, the Court stated: 
It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within 
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers .••. This is 
not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator, for frequently words 
of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include an act in ques-
tion, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation ..• makes it unreasonable to be-
lieve that the legislator intended to include the particular act. 
143 U.S. at 459. The Court then looked at the legislative history and concluded that the evil 
the statute sought to remedy was the importation of cheap, unskilled labor. See 143 U.S. at 
463-65. Hiring a minister to come and preach to a congregation did not contribute to this 
evil, so the Court held that the Church's acts were not punishable under the statute. See 143 
U.S. at472. 
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This view of the scope of the crime of violence provision effectu-
ates the goal of distinguishing risk-creating from riskless threats in 
imposing sentences for them.101 Only risky threats deserve to be 
singled out for the particularly severe punishment imposed on 
crimes of violence102 because only risky threats create the harm that 
the career offender provision seeks to punish - risk of physical 
injury. To insist that all threats be considered crimes of violence 
prevents the Guidelines from achieving their goal of calibrating 
punishments to the degree of harm caused by the crime.103 
A more recent example of this approach is United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 
U.S. 837 (1975). In Forman, the Court had to determine whether "stock" sold by a nonprofit 
housing cooperative qualified as a "security" for purposes of the federal securities laws. The 
Court first noted that the statutory language defined a "security" as " 'any note, stock, trea-
sury stock •.. or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 'security' .•. .' " 
421 U.S. at 847 (quoting § 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933). Despite this apparently clear 
statement that "any ... stock" should be considered a security, the Court refused to interpret 
the statute in this manner because " '[a] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet 
not within the statute, because not within its spirit.'" 421 U.S. at 849 (quoting Church of 
Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 459). Ultimately, the Court concluded that the stock at issue was 
not a security because "[the] shares have none of the characteristics that in our commercial 
world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.'' 421 U.S. at 851 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
101. See supra section III.A. 
102. See supra text accompanying note 59 (arguing that there should be different levels of 
punishment for threats that create risk and those that do not). 
This approach has the additional advantage of making the crime of violence definition 
consistent with the general legal definition of violence: the use or risk of the use of physical 
force so as to injure, damage, or abuse. See supra Part II. While it is not necessary that the 
term of art crime of violence have a meaning that is consistent with the ordinary legal mean-
ing of violence, in the interest of comprehensibility of the law, it is certainly desirable to 
achieve such consistency. 
103. Another way to make the argument asserted in this section is to say that the lesser 
degree of harm caused by riskless threats, as compared with risk-creating threats, was a miti-
gating factor "not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in for-
mulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1994); cf. USSG § 5K2.0, p.s. (quoting the statutory language at the outset 
of its discussion of when departures from the Guidelines are appropriate). 
Tue D.C. Circuit has used this language as a justification for looking at the facts of an 
offense to determine if it is a "crime of violence," even when the offense is clearly within the 
scope of§ 4Bl.2. See United States v. Baskin, 886 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1089 (1990). Baskin states: 
Classifying Baskin as a career offender based on statutory characterizations of his previ-
ous crimes may be improper if an analysis of the facts demonstrates that they were not in 
fact crimes of violence . 
. . . A sentencing judge retains discretion to examine the facts of a predicate crime to 
determine whether it was a crime of violence .••. Obviously, the guidelines' definitions, 
commentary, and the like provide a solid starting point for determining whether a prior 
conviction was in fact a crime of violence. However, it may be appropriate, as provided 
by the guidelines, for a district judge to depart from the guidelines' statutory definition 
... depending on the facts of the case. 
886 F.2d at 389-90. Based on this reasoning, the Baskin court remanded the case to enable 
the trial court to determine whether the facts of the defendant's robbery justified a departure 
from the penalty enhancement stipulated by the career offender provision. See 886 F.2d at 
390. 
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IV. THE ASSESSMENT OF RISK 
Part Ill's argument that the status of a threat as violent or non-
violent depends on whether it created risk raises an obvious ques-
tion: How should courts assess whether a threat created risk? The 
most obvious solution - for courts to examine in detail the con-
duct104 involved in the offense - has been forbidden explicitly by 
the Supreme Court in the ACCA context.1os Courts of appeals siin-
ilarly have rejected a fact-specific, conduct-based inquiry in the con-
text of the career offender provision.106 But although it is 
iinpermissible to engage in elaborate factual investigations at the 
sentencing stage regarding the defendant's conduct, there are two 
ways courts may be able to assess risk created by a threat without 
violating this prohibition. First, the sentencing guideline applicable 
to threats explicitly requires courts to determine if a defendant in-
tended to carry out his threat by examining conduct evidencing in-
tent, so courts should make an exception to the prohibition when 
looking at conduct for this limited purpose. Second, courts can as-
sess whether the defendant had the ability to carry out his threat by 
examining his personal characteristics and the nature of the situa-
tion in which the threat was made, thus avoiding any examination 
of the defendant's conduct. 
This Part argues that courts should determine whether a threat 
created risk - and therefore was violent - by considering two 
factors: (1) whether the threatener had a genuine intent to carry out 
his threat and (2) whether he had the ability to carry out his threat. 
104. Because the career offender provision only applies if the defendant has been con-
victed of two previous crimes of violence in addition to the instant offense, defendants some-
times ask courts to examine their prior criminal conduct as well as their conduct during the 
instant offense. Courts have refused to examine any specific conduct related to the defend-
ant's offenses. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. · 
105. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) ("The Courts of Appeals uni-
formly have held that§ 924(e) mandates a formal categorical approach, looking only to the 
statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those 
convictions. We find the reasoning of these cases persuasive." (citations omitted}}. 
106. See, e.g., United States v. \Vmter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that under 
the career offender provision - § 4Bl.2 - courts are "restricted to an examination of how 
the legislature has defined the crime, without any concomitant inquiry into the details of the 
defendant's actual criminal conduct"); United States v. Joshua, 976 F.2d 844, 856 (3d Cir. 
1992) ("[W]e further hold that a sentencing court should look solely to the conduct alleged in 
... the indictment charging the offense of conviction in order to determine whether that 
offense is a crime of violence .... "); United Sfates v. Telesco, 962 F.2d 165, 166 (2d Cir.1992) 
("When prior convictions are for crimes designated as 'crimes of violence' by the Sentencing 
Commission, the sentencing court is not permitted to examine the actual conduct underlying 
the convictions."); United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1990} (citing 
Taylor and stating that, under § 4Bl.2, "the court should not have to consider the specific 
conduct of the defendant • • . or sentencing hearings will tum into unmanageable mini-
trials"); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 911 F.2d 542, 547 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
sentencing courts should not consider the underlying facts of conviction because "requiring 
sentencing courts to conduct factual inquiries into the specific conduct underlying an earlier 
conviction would present significant practical problems"}, cert. denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991). 
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Section IV.A argues that these two factors are prerequisites for the 
creation of risk and that it is permissible for courts to consider these 
factors in sentencing threateners. Section IV.B contends that focus-
ing on the defendant's "dangerousness" in order to assess risk, as 
several circuits have elected to do, is not as satisfactory an approach 
as considering the two factors suggested by this Note. 
A. Intent and Ability as Risk Determinants 
In order for there to be genuine risk created by a threat - in 
other words, a real possibility that the threat will be carried out -
it is clear that the threatener, at a minim.um, must have the intent to 
carry out the threat and the ability to do so. A threat that the 
speaker has no intention of carrying out may create fear in the re-
cipient, 107 but it does not create risk that physical force actually will 
be used. For example, a person might threaten someone solely for 
the purpose of frightening them, with absolutely no intent to carry 
out the threat. In such a case, there is no risk that force actually 
will be used, even though the recipient of the threat may not know 
this at the time. 
Inquiring into a threatener's intent to carry out his threat some-
times may require courts to look at conduct evidencing intent.108 
Although this may appear to be at odds with the general rule 
against considering specific conduct at the sentencing stage, an ex-
ception should be made for threats because the Sentencing Com-
mission explicitly requires courts to consider conduct evidencing 
intent in section 2A6.1 - the sentencing guideline stipulating the 
punishment level for "Threatening Communications."109 In section 
2A6.1, the Commission establishes a "base offense level"110 for 
threatening communications but then specifically provides for an 
increase in the defendant's sentence "[i]f the offense involved any 
conduct evidencing an intent to carry out such threat. "111 Hence, a 
court imposing sentence on a defendant convicted of making 
threats is required to consider conduct evidencing intent even aside 
107. See supra section I.B. 
108. Cf. Marc Schuyler Reiner, Note, The Public Safety Exception to Miranda: Analyzing 
Subjective Motivation, 93 MlcH. L. REv. 2377, 2386 (1995) (endorsing an examination of 
"objective, external evidence" as a means of determining subjective intent). 
109. See USSG § 2A6.1. 
110. The "base offense level" is the Commission's numerical indication of the seriousness 
of the crime. Once the base offense level for a crime is known, it may be subject to adjust-
ment based on "specific offense characteristics" stipulated in the applicable guideline. See 
USSG § lBl.l(b). The sentence enhancement provided for threateners who engage in "con-
duct evidencing an intent to carry out [their] threat" is an example of a "specific offense 
characteristic." The defendant's sentence is determined by plugging his offense level - ad-
justed as necessary - and his criminal history category into a matrix provided in the Guide-
lines. See USSG Ch.5, Pt.A Sentencing Table. 
111. USSG § 2A6.l(b)(l). 
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from the need to assess risk.112 Consequently, if courts consider 
this factor when deciding whether a threat was violent, no addi-
tional time or investigatory effort will be required. 
The importance of the threatener's ability to carry out his threat 
is an even more fundamental indicator of risk than his intent to do 
so because, by definition, if the threatener is incapable of carrying 
out his threat, there is no risk that the threatened conduct actually 
will take place. For example, the defendant in United States v. 
Mitchell,113 who threatened while in custody in Hawaii to drown 
President Reagan in the Atlantic Ocean, clearly did not have the 
capacity to carry out his threat, and thus there was no chance that 
the threatened conduct would occur. 
The "Threatening Communications" sentencing guideline does 
not expressly require courts to consider the defendant's ability to 
carry out the threat, as it does with intent, but the propriety of such 
an inquiry is affirmed by the Sentencing Commission's commentary 
to section 2A6.1. The Commission stated: "These [threat] statutes 
cover a wide range of conduct, the seriousness of which depends on 
the defendant's intent and the likelihood that the defendant would 
carry out the threat. "114 Given that the "likelihood" of a defendant 
carrying out his threat is a direct function of his ability to carry it 
out, this language is a strong invitation for courts to inquire into a 
defendant's ability at the sentencing stage.11s 
The defendant's ability to carry out his threat can be measured 
by the characteristics of the defendant himself - and the nature of 
the situation - rather than by looking at the defendant's conduct. 
For example, a court considering the ability of a defendant to carry 
out a bomb threat might consider any number of characteristics of 
the defendant himself: his technical knowledge of bomb manufac-
turing, his prior criminal record, his psychiatric condition, his access 
112. It is worth observing that this Note's approach imposes a sort of "multiple penalty" 
on threateners who have an intent to carry out their threat. Such intent would subject a 
threatener to the sentence enhancement required by § 2A6.l, expose him to potential liabil-
ity under the career offender provision, and deny him access to the reduced mental capacity 
provision - provided, with respect to the latter two, that he also had the ability to carry out 
the threat. Given the risk posed by threateners who intend to carry out their threats, this 
enhancement of punishment seems justified. 
113. 812 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1987); see also supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text 
(discussing Mitchell). 
114. USSG § 2A6.l, comment. (backg'd.) (emphasis added). 
115. In another part of the commentary to the Threatening Communications guideline, 
the Commission cautions that the variable nature of threats should cause courts to consider 
other available information about the offense at the sentencing stage. The Commentary 
states: 
The Commission recognizes that this offense includes a particularly wide range of 
conduct and that it is not possible to include all of the potentially relevant circumstances 
in the offense level. Factors not incorporated in the guideline may be considered by the 
court in determining whether a departure from the guidelines is warranted. 
USSG § 2A6.1, comment. (n.1). 
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to explosive materials, and so on. The court also would consider 
situational variables such as the vulnerability of the target. There-
fore, examining a defendant's ability to carry out his threat during 
sentencing is not barred by the proscription against inquiring into 
prior conduct because ability depends on the situation and the char-
acteristics of the defendant himself, not his conduct in committing 
the offense. 
B. The "Dangerousness" Approach 
Several courts analyzing the reduced mental capacity provision 
have concluded that threats sometimes may qualify as non-violent 
offenses116 and have held that "the term 'non-violent offense' in 
section 5K2.13 refers to those offenses that, in the act, reveal that a 
defendant is not dangerous."117 This approach finds support in the 
language of the reduced mental capacity provision118 and has the 
desirable effect of permitting some threateners suffering from re-
duced mental capacity to obtain sentence reductions. This section 
argues that despite these virtues, focusing on the defendant's "dan-
gerousness" in the abstract is not as effective in assessing risk as 
focusing specifically on his intent and ability to carry out the threat 
and suggests that "dangerousness" is not a characteristic that can be 
discerned reliably by courts. 
Although the court in United States v. Chatman119 - and the 
courts that have followed it - advocated focusing on the defend-
ant's "dangerousness" as the key determinant of whether he com-
mitted a non-violent offense, this standard is not precise enough for 
courts to apply effectively. In itself, the instruction to look at "dan-
gerousness" is extremely ambiguous: Does the court mean the de-
fendant's current dangerousness, future dangerousness, or 
dangerousness at the time the act was committed?120 Should courts 
116. See supra note 8 (collecting cases). 
117. This language is from United States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1452 (D.C. Cir. 
1993), and is quoted with approval by United States v. Weddle, 30 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 
1994). The court in United States v. Premachandra, 32 F.3d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1994), did not 
explicitly agree with the Chatman approach, but it did sustain the district court's decision -
which relied on Chatman - to consider the "facts and circumstances" of the offense. 
Note that there is no prohibition against looking at the underlying conduct of the offense 
with respect to § 5K2.13; this prohibition only applies to the crime of violence definition. See 
supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text. 
118. The focus on dangerousness is probably derived from the final clause of § 5K2.13, 
which permits a downward departure from the Guidelines based on reduced mental capacity 
only if "the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need ... to protect the public." 
USSG § 5K2.13, p.s. While Chatman and its progeny are no doubt correct that § 5K2.13 
seeks to prevent departures for dangerous offenders, this issue is separate from whether an 
offense was dangerous. 
119. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1446. 
120. If the Chatman court was concerned with present or future dangerousness, its opin-
ion did not explain exactly why characterizing an act committed in the past as "violent" or 
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focus on the general danger the defendant poses to society or just 
the specific danger he poses of actually carrying out his threat? 
Most importantly, by what criteria is dangerousness to be judged? 
One illustration of the potential problems that can result from 
the vagueness of the "dangerousness" standard is the case of United 
States v. Weddle. 121 In Weddle, the defendant sent his wife's lover 
- Angleberger - three letters: one threatened to "hunt 
[Angleberger] down and eliminate him from the picture"; the sec-
ond stated, "You are going to pay for what you did"; and the third 
contained three bullets with Angleberger's name and address af-
fixed to them.122 Weddle also attempted to run Angleberger off the 
road and then chased him to his home and attempted to assault him 
with a "slapjack."123 
Weddle was convicted of mailing threatening communications in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 and, at sentencing, sought a downward 
departure under section 5K2.13 on the grounds that he had suffered 
a "depressive episode" that led to "reduced mental capacity" dur-
ing his commission of the offense. The court allowed the downward 
departure on the theory that the behavior was non-violent because 
it was "attributable to the depressive episode, and highly unlikely to 
be repeated" - in other words, because Weddle was not danger-
ous.124 Because the court believed Weddle was not dangerous, it 
determined that his offense was "non-violent" and granted him a 
sentence reduction under section 5K2.13. 
Under the generally accepted legal definition of violence -
which considers the creation of risk of the use of physical force to 
constitute violence - it is clearly inappropriate to characterize 
Weddle's threats as "non-violent offenses." Based on his attempted 
assault on Angleberger, it was apparent that Weddle had both the 
intent and the ability to carry out his threats - in short, that he 
presented a real risk to Angleberger. His repeated threats demon-
strate that his assault was not the product of a sudden emotional 
response, but rather was part of a calculated program by which 
Weddle hoped to intimidate Angleberger into ending his affair with 
Weddle's wife. The only explanation for the court's characteriza-
tion of Weddle's threats as non-violent is that it was swayed unduly 
"non-violent" should depend on the defendant's present or future dangerousness. It is prob-
ably better, therefore, to read Chatman as requiring an assessment of the defendant's danger-
ousness at the time the act was committed. This would explain its statement that non-violent 
offenses are those that "in the act, reveal that the defendant is not dangerous." 986 F.2d at 
1452 (emphasis added). But if this is what Chatman means, its use of the present tense -
"the defendant is not dangerous" - is confusing. 
121. Weddle, 30 F.3d at 532. 
122. 30 F.3d at 534-355. 
123. See 30 F.3d at 534. 
124. 30 F.3d at 540. 
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by sympathy for Weddle: the court made reference to the fact that 
Weddle was a former police officer and that many members of the 
community had written letters attesting to his "exemplary" charac-
ter.125 But these admirable qualities cannot overcome the simple 
fact that there was genuine risk that Weddle would carry out his 
threat. In applying the "dangerousness" test, the Weddle court lost 
sight of the risk created by Weddle's conduct, and thus mis-
characterized his threats as non-violent. 
The opinion that created the "dangerousness" test - United 
States v. Chatman126 - seems to recognize that the dangerousness 
test can be effective only if courts focus on the factors specified in 
this Note: the intent and ability of the threatener to carry out his 
threat. Chatman's guidance regarding application of the "danger-
ousness" test begins with the rather vague instruction to "consider 
all the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the 
crime" in arriving at a determination of the defendant's dangerous-
ness.127 As Chatman discusses what particular facts and circum-
stances might be relevant, however, it becomes clear that what the 
court really considers important is the defendant's intent and ability 
to carry out his threat. This is revealed in Chatman's criticism of 
United States v. Poff,128 where it states: "The Seventh Circuit held 
that a downward departure under section 5K2.13 was unavailable to 
the defendant .... On the record of the case, however, it appeared 
that the defendant neither intended nor was able to carry out her 
threats, suggesting that, in fact, her crime was a 'non-violent of-
fense.' "129 Thus, in spirit Chatman seems to favor an approach 
similar to that advocated by this Note.130 But by vaguely character-
izing its test as one of "dangerousness," the Chatman approach cre-
ates a possibility that courts will focus on facts that are not 
probative of the risk created by the defendant's threat. 
Moreover, the Weddle case is not the only proof of the problems 
with an unstructured inquiry into dangerousness. A substantial 
body of psychiatric and social science research indicates that if 
courts attempt to engage in generalized estimates of defendants' 
dangerousness, they are unlikely to make accurate judgments. The 
experts in the dangerousness-prediction field send a surprising clear 
125. See 30 F.3d at 540 n.5. 
126. 986 F.2d 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
127. 986 F.2d at 1452. 
128. 926 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991). 
129. Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452-53 (emphasis added). 
130. Indeed, it is hard to distinguish between an inquiry designed to determine whether 
an act created "risk" and one to determine whether an act created "danger." The approach 
advocated by this Note, however, gives precise instructions for how to assess whether risk 
was created; the Chatman "dangerousness" test provides no such guidance, forcing courts to 
attempt ad hoc character assessments of defendants. 
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message: given current knowledge and methodology, an accurate 
prediction of violence and dangerousness is nearly impossible, even 
for trained specialists.131 One commentator observes: 
Rarely have research data been as quickly or nearly universally 
accepted by the academic and professional communities as those sup-
porting the proposition that mental health professionals are highly in-
accurate at predicting violent behavior. We shall consider prediction 
research in detail in subsequent chapters, but the reader had best be 
forewarned that stock in the predictive enterprise is going very 
cheaply.132 
Another analyst surveyed a number of the empirical studies that 
attempted to assess the accuracy of dangerousness and violence 
predictions and concluded: "[W]e know ... that there has been no 
empirical demonstration by any profession . . . of accuracy in the 
prediction of violence in either the criminal justice or mental health 
system beyond that attainable by chance itself."133 Pretrial-risk-
prediction studies indicate that assessments of dangerousness are 
correct "[a]t best ... one time out of three."134 Although it is true 
that the criminal justice process already incorporates "dangerous-
ness" assessments at several stages - pretrial detention decisions 
and involuntary commitment decisions being notable examples13S 
- this does not justify extending such a faulty analytical classifica-
131. One experienced researcher relates: "The prediction of violent behavior has occu-
pied a major portion of my professional career •.•. Can we predict violence? In the begin-
ning of my career I would have replied, of course. 1\venty years later, my answer is, no." 
Edwin I. Megargee, Methodological Problems in the Prediction of Violence, in VIOLENCE 
AND THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, supra note 31, at 179, 179. 
Another analyst expresses a similar sentiment. At the beginning of a section entitled 
"Can Dangerousness Be Predicted," Saleem Shah states: "Given the considerable literature 
that has developed on the topic, many, if not most, persons may well respond to such a 
question with a flat, No!" Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: Conceptual, Prediction, and Pub-
lic Policy Issues, in VIOLENCE AND THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL, supra note 31, at 151, 160. 
132. MONAHAN, supra note 31, at 27. Monahan quotes a variety of other commentators 
expressing similar sentiments. One states: "Neither psychiatrists nor other behavioral scien-
tists are able to predict the occurrence of violent behavior with sufficient reliability to justify 
the restriction of freedom of persons on the basis of the label of potential dangerousness." 
Id. at 28 (quoting Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. 
PA. L. REv. 439, 452 (1974)). 
133. Henry J. Steadman, How Well Can We Predict Violence For Adults?: A Review of the 
Literature and Some Commentary, in THE PREmcnoN OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 5, 7 
(Femand N. Dutile & Cleon H. Foust eds., 1987). 
Steadman offers the following grim assessment of the ability of experts to predict vio-
lence: "I fear that the current situation with regard to predicting criminal violence in our 
courts reflects ••. the 'Seersucker Theory' of experts .... 'No matter how much evidence 
exists that seers do not exist, suckers will pay for the existence of seers.'" Id. at 16 (quoting 
J. Scott Armstrong, The Seer-Sucker Theory: The Value of Experts in Forecasting, 82 TECH. 
REv. 18, 19 (1980)). 
134. Mary A. Toborg & John P. Bellassai, Attempts to Predict Pretrial Violence: Research 
Findings and Legislative Responses, in THE PRED1cnoN OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, supra note 
133, at 101, 104. 
135. See generally MONAHAN, supra note 31, at 22-23 (collecting examples of points in the 
legal process where dangerousness is considered). 
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tion to other contexts. When the immediate safety of the public or 
the defendant himself is in jeopardy, it may be necessary for courts 
to make dangerousness estimates, but the sentencing of a convicted 
criminal presents no such exigency. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has argued that threats should only be considered "vi-
olent" when they create risk and that the creation of risk should be 
determined by examining whether the threatener had the intent 
and ability to carry out his threat. As applied to the opening hypo-
thetical, this approach means that the threat by the incarcerated 
mental patient in Hawaii should not be considered violent: even in 
the unlikely event that he had the intent to carry out his threat, he 
clearly did not have the ability to do so. Thus, although he could -
and should - be punished for his crime of making threats, the 
mental patient should also be eligible for a reduced sentence based 
on his reduced mental capacity under section 5K2.13 because his 
offense was non-violent. 
By contrast, the threat by the twice-convicted, disgruntled, for-
mer employee is a violent offense. His threat created risk because 
he had the intent to carry out his threat - if he was truly disgrun-
tled - and, living nearby, he clearly had the ability to carry it out. 
Thus, his offense should qualify as a crime of violence for purposes 
of deciding if he is a career offender under section 4Bl.2, and he 
should not be eligible for a sentence reduction based on reduced 
mental capacity under section 5K2.13. 
These divergent results demonstrate the importance of the con-
clusion that creation of risk is what makes a threat violent: people 
who make threats that create risk and fear should be sentenced 
more harshly than those whose threats create only fear. This can 
happen, however, only if the Sentencing Guidelines are interpreted 
in a manner that distinguishes the risky threats from the riskless. 
Failure to make this distinction impairs the ability of the justice sys-
tem to sentence offenders in proportion to the degree of harm they 
caused. Because courts readily can determine if threats are violent 
by examining the intent and ability of threateners to carry out their 
threats, they should do so and reduce or increase offenders' 
sentences accordingly. 
